http://www.sailingwarship.com/the-battle-of-quiberon-bay-21-november-1759-the-day-after.html Mon, 09 Jan 2012 00:47:51 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 http://www.sailingwarship.com/the-battle-of-quiberon-bay-21-november-1759-the-day-after.html/comment-page-1#comment-5 » The Capture of the Foudroyant by HMS Mounmouth, 28 February 1758 History of the Sailing Warship in the Marine Art: Sun, 25 May 2008 21:11:39 +0000 http://www.sailingwarship.com/?p=19#comment-5 [...] Hawke’s victory was all the more remarkable because he attacked as night fell. Night-time actions were exceptionally dangerous. It was difficult enough to maneuver fleets of ships without collision in daylight and in calm weather, but at night and in a storm it was all but impossible. Ships would hang lanterns in their rigging and off the stern, but distance remained almost impossible to judge. It is not insignificant that, just prior to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, a squadron of British ships attacked and captured the Foudroyant at night, the subject of this painting. British seamanship had reached a level where night-time attack was possible. The officers were sufficiently confident in their own seamanship and perhaps more importantly, in the seamanship of their colleagues, to risk such an attack. Because it was a risky tactic it was unexpected, and because it was unexpected it was particularly effective. [...] [...] Hawke’s victory was all the more remarkable because he attacked as night fell. Night-time actions were exceptionally dangerous. It was difficult enough to maneuver fleets of ships without collision in daylight and in calm weather, but at night and in a storm it was all but impossible. Ships would hang lanterns in their rigging and off the stern, but distance remained almost impossible to judge. It is not insignificant that, just prior to the Battle of Quiberon Bay, a squadron of British ships attacked and captured the Foudroyant at night, the subject of this painting. British seamanship had reached a level where night-time attack was possible. The officers were sufficiently confident in their own seamanship and perhaps more importantly, in the seamanship of their colleagues, to risk such an attack. Because it was a risky tactic it was unexpected, and because it was unexpected it was particularly effective. [...]

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